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Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Subpoena Must
Be Initiated hy Service of ProcessHemphill v. Lenz*
Over a four-year period the city of Philadelphia had entered
into contracts with Marbelite Company, a New York corporation,
for traffic signal equipment. Acting pursuant to section 8-409 of
the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter,1 the city controller served
the treasurer of Marbelite, in Philadelphia,2 with a subpoena requiring him to produce certain corporate records and to testify concerning requisitions for payments on the contracts. Refusing to comply with the subpoena, the treasurer returned to New York. 8 The

• 413 Pa. 9, 195 A.2d 780 (1963).
I. PHILADELPHIA HO!\[E RULE CHARTER § 8-409 (1951) provides:

"Power to Obtain Attendance of Witnesses and Production of Documents. Every
officer, department, board or commission authorized to hold hearings or conduct
investigations shall have power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the
production of documents and other evidence and for that purpose it may issue
subpoenas requiring the attendance of persons and the production of documents
and cause them to be served in any part of the City. If any witness shall refuse
to testify as to any fact within his knowledge or to produce any documents
within his possession or under his control, the facts relating to such refusal
shall forthwith be reported to any one of the Courts of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County and all questions arising upon such refusal • . . shall as
promptly as possible be heard by such court. If the court shall determine that
the testimony or document required of such witness is legally competent and ought
to be given or produced by him, the court may make an order commanding
such witness to testify or to produce documents or do both and if the witness
shall thereafter refuse so to testify or so to produce documents in disobedience of
such order of the court, the court may deal with the witness as in other cases."
Section 6-402 specifically authorizes the controller to subpoena any person to obtain
evidence in connection with payments demanded from the city, but provides no
enforcement procedure.
2. Since the powers conferred by the Charter do not ex.tend beyond Philadelphia's
geographical limits, the subpoena is invalid unless served within the city limits.
PHILADELPHIA CHARTER COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE VOTERS BY THE PHILADELPHIA
CHARTER COMMISSION 260 (1952).
3. Counsel for the treasurer of Marbelite appeared before the controller to deny
the validity of the subpoena, arguing that service on a foreign corporation ex.tended
the controller's jurisdiction beyond the city limits. Brief for Appellant, p. 16a,
Hemphill v. Lenz, 413 Pa. 9, 195 A.2d 780 (1963) [hereinafter cited as principal case].
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controller then filed a petition in the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County and obtained an order to show cause why the
treasurer should not be compelled to obey the subpoena. The treasurer appeared specially to contest the court's jurisdiction on the
ground that he had not been served with the court's process. The
common pleas court overruled this objection, apparently reasoning
that, because of the treasurer's evasive tactics to avoid process, registered letters mailed to the company's New York office supplied
notice of the impending proceeding and sufficed to give the court
jurisdiction.4 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
held) reversed, one judge dissenting. A judicial proceeding for enforcement of an administrative subpoena under section 8-409 must
be commenced by service of process from the enforcing court.
While the power to issue subpoenas5 is inherent in courts of
record, 6 administrative agencies require statutory authorization to
issue subpoenas.7 Most federal and state agencies, including municipalities, are given broad authority to issue subpoenas.8 While the
United States Supreme Court at one time limited the use of administrative subpoenas to inquiries involving a specific breach of
the law,9 the Court has since repudiated this restrictive view, 10 thus
This objection probably was not well taken because the treasurer was served within
the city and Marbelite had contracted to observe the provisions of the Philadelphia
Home Rule Charter. Brief for Appellee, p. 5. The point was not raised on appeal.
4. Principal case at 12, 195 A.2d at 782. PA. R. CIV. P. § 2079(a)(2), requires that
out-of-state service on nonresident defendants be made either personally or by
registered letter -mailed by the sheriff to the defendant. Although the controller
mailed at least two registered letters to the treasurer, he failed to send them through
the sheriff's office. Hence, the controller failed to follow either method prescribed
by § 2079. The trial judge ruled that this failure was inconsequential. Brief for
Appellant, p. 20a, principal case. Cf. PA. R. CIV. P. § 126, which directs a trial judge
to disregard errors or defects in procedure which do not affect the substantive rights
of the parties. It seems evident that the continuing business relationship between
Marbelite and the city would bring the company within the reach of Pennsylvania's
long-arm statute. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3142 (1958). A provision in the contract
with Marbelite, appointing a city officer as agent for the company to receive service
of process might have enabled the city to avoid altogether the need for out-of-state
service. See National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964); Comment,
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 733 (1964).
5. The term subpoena, as used hereafter, includes a subpoena duces tecum.
6. Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42,
65-66 (1924) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Willard, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 476-77 (1839).
7. In re Application of Clark, 65 Conn. 17, 31, 31 Atl. 522, 524 (1894); Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Orsini, 368 Pa. 259, 263, 81 A.2d 891, 893 (1951).
8. For a comprehensive review of subpoena powers under all -major federal statutes,
see Rogge, Inquisitions by Officials-A Study of Due Process Requirements in
Administrative Investigations, 47 MINN. L. REv. 939 (1963). An illustrative state statute
is PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 200 (1962), set forth in note 23 infra. See also Ebel, Investigatory Powers of City Councils, 38 l\fARQ. L. REv. 223 (1955).
9. Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908). Although the decision rested on statutory
construction, the Court's language suggested that the prohibition against subpoenas
in solely investigatory proceedings was constitutionally required. Id. at 419-20.
10. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950); Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1946) (dictum).
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permitting issuance by agencies in purely investigatory proceedings.
Where issuance is authorized by statute, state court decisions generally uphold the validity of an administrative subpoena unless "the
futility of the process to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable
or obvious ...." 11
The effectiveness of a subpoena lies in the power of the issuing
tribunal to compel compliance. Unlike courts of record, however,
administrative agencies generally have not been empowered to punish noncompliance by fine or imprisonment.12 For example, federal
agencies must invoke the aid of federal district courts to enforce
subpoenas.13 In 1894 the Supreme Court endorsed this indirect enforcement procedure in ICC v. Brimson,14 and in dictum proscribed
direct agency enforcement of subpoenas.15 The Court concluded
that administrative tribunals could not be granted authority to compel obedience because subpoena enforcement requires a final determination, essentially judicial rather than administrative, that the
subpoenaed party is under a legal duty to comply.16 Congressional
adherence to the indirect enforcement procedure has forestalled a
test of the Brimson dictum, itself now questionable. 17 However,
some states have provided for direct agency enforcement, 18 and some
have even delegated this power to municipalities.19 In these states
the courts generally require explicit statutory authority,20 although
one court has held that direct enforcement power is inherent in
11. Matter of Edge Ho Holding Corp., 256 N.Y. 374, 381, 176 N.E. 537, 539
(1931). See I DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 3.04 (1958), for a discussion of recent
trends in federal and state decisions. The validity of the subpoena was not questioned
in the principal case.
12. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2195(4) (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
13. E.g., 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958) (FTC); 48 Stat. 899 (1934), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1958) (SEC); 26 Stat. 743 (1891), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 12(3) (1958) (ICC); 72 Stat. 792 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1484(c) (1958) (CAB); 49 Stat.
455 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1958) (NLRB).
14. 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
15. "Such [an administrative] body could not, under our system of government,
and consistently with due process of law, be invested with authority to compel
obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine or imprisonment." Id. at 485.
16. Ibid.
17. The contempt power is not exclusively judicial; Congress can punish for
contempt of its committees. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935). Many commentators argue that the enforcement power can be delegated to federal administrative
agencies. E.g., Benton, Administrative Subpoena Enforcement, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 874,
883 (1963); Note, 71 HAR.v. L. REv. 1541, 1552 (1958).
18. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 257.322 (1960) (automobile license appeal board
granted power to punish for contempt); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-124 (1955) (state board
of optometry granted power to punish for contempt); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5190 (1962) (industrial commission granted power to punish for contempt). Apparently
no due process objection to contempt citations imposed by state agencies has reached
the Supreme Court. However, some state courts have invalidated statutes investing
boards with the power to punish for disobedience. E.g., People v. Swena, 88 Colo.
337, 296 Pac. 271 (1931); Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 31 N.E. 190 (1892).
19. See generally Ebel, supra note 8, at 235 &: nn. 104-13.
20. See, e.g., In the Matter of Blue, 46 Mich. 268, 9 N.W. 441 (1881).
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agencies authorized to issue subpoenas.21 Nevertheless, most states
permit only indirect enforcement, perhaps reflecting a general attitude that the power to punish for contempt should be limited to
an independent judiciary and not entrusted to an indefinite number
of loosely supervised, semi-political public officials.22 However, the
subpoena enforcement procedures in both the Pennsylvania Administrative Procedure Act23 and section 8-409 of the Philadelphia
Home Rule Charter24 requiring indirect enforcement are similar
to those followed by federal agencies and most states.
Utilization of the indirect enforcement procedure raises the
question of whether the jurisdiction of the enforcing court is dependent upon additional service of process on the subpoenaed party
when an agency, rather than the court, initially issues the subpoena.
Had the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter directed the controller to
secure subpoenas from the court of common pleas, no question regarding that court's jurisdiction would have arisen in the principal
case, since the treasurer was served with the subpoena within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Some jurisdictions have restricted authority to issue subpoenas to the courts,25 but judicial control over issuance has proved an ineffective check against potential
abuse of the subpoena power.26 Unless the subpoenaed party objects,
a court usually cannot test a subpoena's validity and, thus, is not
in a position to govern its issuance. Indeed, judges seldom issue
subpoenas; almost uniformly the clerk of the court issues a blank
subpoena to a party upon request.27 In New York, for example, an
21. In the Matter of Hayes, 200 N.C. 133, 156 S.E. 791 (1931) (Industrial Commission administering the Workmen's Compensation Act).
22. "The subpoena power 'is a power capable of oppressive use, especially when
it may be indiscriminately delegated and the subpoena is not returnable before a
judicial officer.•• .' " United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 187 (1956). Perhaps the
dictum in ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894), has persuaded state legislatures
to enact the indirect enforcement procedure. See note 15 supra and accompanying
text. See also 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 12, for a collection of cases and statutes.
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 200 (1962), provides:
"Every administrative department, every independent administrative board and
commission, every departmental and administrative board and commission, and
the several workmen's referees, shall have the power to issue subpoenas, requiring the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers
pertinent to any hearing before such department, board, commission, or officer,
and to examine such witnesses, books, and papers. Any witness, who refuses to
obey a subpoena issued hereunder, or who refuses to be sworn or affirmed, or
to testify, or who is guilty of any contempt after summons to appear, may be
punished for contempt of court, and, for this purpose, an application may be
made to any court of common pleas within whose territoriaf jurisdiction the
offense was committed, for which purpose, such court is hereby given jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.)
24. Note 1 supra.
25. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1886, Ch. 543 (now N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 7).
26. Traditionally, potential abuse of the subpoena power ·has been a judicial
concern. See note 22 supra. This theme is also present in the principal case. See
notes 30 &: 31 infra and accompanying text.
27. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a); 12 PA. R. CIV. P. 4018; MICH. RULES 506.2.
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attorney to a court proceeding is empowered by statute to issue
subpoenas.28
Under the New York statute and similar provmons in other
states,29 a lawyer seeking judicial aid to enforce a validly served subpoena need not serve the subpoenaed party with additional process
or a complaint. Admittedly, issuance by an attorney occurs only after
the proceeding is before the court. Nevertheless, the la'wyer's relation
to the court resembles closely that of the administrator under the
indirect enforcement procedure: both complete and serve subpoenas
without the court's knowledge, but both must apply to the court for
enforcement. Although the administrator, unlike the lawyer, is not
an officer of the court, this distinction seemingly does not demand an
additional procedural requirement for judicial enforcement of the
administrative subpoena. Furthermore, a requirement that additional
process be served upon a subpoenaed person before enforcement
proceedings may be instituted provides no safeguards that are not already present in the indirect enforcement procedure. Judicial control over the subpoena is necessarily maintained at the enforcement
stage, when the subpoenaed party is before the court. Upon proper
objection the judge can modify or quash an oppressive or unwarranted subpoena. Therefore, the Pennsylvania court was unnecessarily restrictive in its attitude of "utmost caution" 30 toward the use
and enforcement of an administrative subpoena simply because, in
the abstract, "the subpoena power is fraught with the possibilities
of abuse." 31 Actions to enforce judicial or administrative subpoenas
are only ancillary to a main proceeding. Accordingly, once a subpoena itself is validly served, it seems anomalous to impose a requirement of acquisition of jurisdiction by another service of process in
a subsequent subpoena enforcement proceeding. The anomaly is
even greater when this requirement is imposed only in proceedings
to enforce administrative subpoenas.32
28. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW § 2302.
29. E.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 45(£); PA. R. Crv. P. 4019; MICH. RULES 506.6.
30. Principal case at 12, 195 A.2d at 782. Seemingly, the court reasoned that the
possibilities of abuse raised a presumption against jurisdiction which the Home
Rule Charter failed to rebut specifically.
31. Ibid. "Possibilities of abuse" exist at every level of government; however,
there is no reason to suppose that the potentiality for abuse is greater at the municipal
level. See Ebel, supra note 8, to the effect that city councils have, on the whole,
wisely used the subpoena power. Historically, local officers have been invested with
the power to subpoena. See In re Application of Clark, 65 Conn. 17, 31 Atl. 522
(1894). Moreover, the presence of the subpoena power in the Philadelphia Home
Rule Charter represents a policy assessment that the need for the power outweighs
any attendant risk of abuse. The Home Rule Charter enjoys the stature accorded
a state legislative enactment. In re Addison, 385 Pa. 48, 57, 122 A.2d 272, 276 (1956).
32. Compare the principal case with United States v. Vivian, 224 F.2d 53, 57
(7th Cir. 1955):
"It would frustrate the theory and purpose of § 235(a) [of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952] if every rejected subpoena would have to be subjected
to a separate civil proceeding accompanied by issuance of process bottomed on
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In the principal case, the court might have construed section
8-409 of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter33 so as to reach a
different conclusion. The statute stresses a speedy determination and
outlines few procedural steps, thus suggesting that a complete civil
action is not contemplated. Moreover, the Pennsylvania Administrative Procedure Act, 34 which the court seemingly rejected as an aid
in interpreting the Home Rule Charter,85 expressly provides that
initial issuance of the subpoena by an agency confers jurisdiction
on the referrant court to enforce compliance. Despite apparent ambiguity in many federal statutes,86 this more liberal view also prevails
in the federal courts because, as the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has stated, "pyramiding summonses on subpoenas serves no
useful purpose." 87 It may be that the Pennsylvania court was concerned that, without an additional service of process, a subpoenaed
party might not receive fair notice that an enforcement proceeding
had been commenced against him. However, a registered letter informing the subpoenaed party of the enforcement action constitutes
reasonable notice,88 and this procedure had been employed by the
city controller.so
a complaint•.•• Application to the district court was the statutory § 235 method
of enforcing a subpoena by an order of court decreeing compliance. Clearly,
enforcement by such an order ought to be a sure expeditious way of gaining
obedience because disregard of the district court's order constitutes contempL To
construe the judicial aid mentioned in § 235 as requiring resort to instituting
a new law suit requiring service of process, at its threshhold, would frustrate
the clear purpose of § 235. Again we point out [the subpoenaed witness] is only
sought as a witness and in an entirely different proceeding against other persons
now awaiting her attendance to give testimony. On her theory every witness
could forestall the government and force it to institute as many law suits as
there are witnesses in any given case."
33. Note 1 supra.
34. Note 23 supra.
35. Principal case at 13 n.5, 195 A.2d at 782 n.5.
36. United States v. Vivian, 224 F.2d 53, 57 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
953 (1956); Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 122 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1941);
Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1941); United States v. Tyson's
Poultry, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Ark. 1963).
37. United States v. Vivian, supra note 36, at 57. Similar federal holdings include
the cases cited in note 36 supra. A state case taking the opposite view is BroveIIi
v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 524, 364 P.2d 462 (1961) (suggestion that valid service
of both subpoena and order to show cause are prerequisites to judicial enforcement
of administrative subpoena).
38. "Nor can we say that the mailing of the notice of suit to appellant by
registered mail at its home office was not reasonably calculated to apprise appellant
of the suit." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
39. Note 4 supra. The method of subpoena enforcement under the Philadelphia
Home Rule Charter actually gives the subpoenaed party a second opportunity
to comply because he will not be held in contempt of court unless he disregards
a court order compelling him to appear before the administrative agency. This
procedure affords the subpoenaed party protection against inadvertent failure to
respond initially to the subpoena. Compare N.Y. CIV. PRAc. I.Aw § 2808(b), under
which failure to comply initially with an authorized, nonjudicial subpoena may
have immediate consequences: the court can order the subpoenaed party to pay
the issuer of the subpoena fifty dollars as well as impose costs not exceeding fifty
dollars.
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Although under the Pennsylvania long-arm statute40 the nonresident subpoenaed party in the principal case may now be served
with process conferring jurisdiction on the court, the holding not
only discourages respect for the administrative subpoena 4' but also
impairs efficient disposition of administrative affairs.4 In the interest both of effectuating the subpoena power and of promoting only
meaningful procedure, courts should rule that valid service of the
subpoena is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court in an enforcement proceeding.

40. Note 4 supra.
41. "A subpoena has never been treated as an invitation to a game of hare and
hounds, in which the witness must testify only if cornered at the end of the chase.
If that were the case, then, indeed, the great power of testimonial compulsion, so
necessary to the effective functioning of courts and legislatures, would be a nullity.
We have often iterated the importance of this public duty.
United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
42. A strong argument in favor of direct subpoena enforcement by an administrative agency is the potentially long delay in obtaining a final judicial order.
See Benton, supra note 17, at 886-87.

